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1  Introduction
the goals of the 3Rs (replacing animals with non-animals (or 
animals of lower sentience), reduction in the number of ani-
mals used, and refining procedures so less harm is caused to 
the animals that are used) have gained wide acceptance over the 
50 years since they were first proposed. These goals are now 
widely known and generally well accepted, both among insti-
tutions using animals in research and testing and among those 
working to protect animals from the harm caused by this use. 
these goals are explicitly referenced in many legislative texts 
and guidelines and are often cited by animal users in their com-
ments to the public. Thus the 3Rs seem to be used as evidence 
of the research community’s commitment to meet high ethical 
standards in the care and use of laboratory animals. 
these principles seem so clear and comprehensive that it is 
tempting to believe that the only remaining challenge is to see 
that these are fully implemented in laboratories around the world 
and that this full implementation will pave the way for broad 
public support for any continued use of animals deemed neces-
sary. However, there are important ethical issues that the 3Rs do 
not address, e.g., to what extent it is acceptable to genetically 
modify animals, or does the purpose of the experiment justify 
animal use. These issues are discussed elsewhere (Schuppli et 
al., 2004; Ibrahim, 2006) and will not be addressed in this paper. 
Instead, we focus on controversial ethical issues hidden within 
the 3Rs principle. We will highlight five such hidden value con-
flicts and argue that these conflicts will challenge the idea that 
the 3Rs principle is bound to generate a wide public consensus. 
We argue, rather, that underlying value differences will lead to 
conflicting interpretations on how to apply the 3Rs principle.
2  Reduction: Fewer animals used or  
more efficient animal use?
At first glance, Reduction should be a clear and easily measur-
able target – after all, it is simply a question of counting. Re-
duction also should proceed in lock step with Replacement, as 
every animal test replaced by a non-animal alternative repre-
sents a reduction in the number of animals used. Unfortunately, 
the data available (Taylor et al., 2008; Ormandy et al., 2009) 
indicate there is no longer any real progress in reducing the total 
number of animals used. Indeed, animal use has been stable or 
on the rise since the 1990s.
This evidence is taken by some critics of animal use (BUAV, 
2011) as an indicator that we have failed to meet the goal of 
Reduction. Policymakers seem to have abandoned the idea of 
setting numerical targets for Reduction (see EBRA, 1996), and 
some scientists have argued that reducing the total numbers used 
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is not even desirable, as it might limit the expansion of animal 
research into new areas (Hagelin et al., 1999). Major institu-
tions that promote the 3Rs now describe Reduction in relative 
rather than absolute terms as “methods that minimize animal 
use and enable researchers to obtain comparable levels of infor-
mation from fewer animals or to obtain more information from 
the same number of animals”1.
Overall, this issue illustrates how different groups of people 
differ in how they interpret goals such as Reduction. These dif-
ferences likely reflect underlying disagreement on values. For 
those who think that using animals in research is in itself wrong, 
the goal should be to reduce all use, and thus only absolute 
reductions in the numbers of animals used can be considered 
progress. For those who consider the scientific goals as para-
mount, the issue of animal use is simply a question of efficiency. 
The use of fewer animals to achieve the same scientific goal is 
better, but the total number of animals used can increase if this 
results in more knowledge. 
3  Reduce or Refine?
Some procedures can be performed such that they either inflict 
less harm on more animals or inflict more harm on fewer ani-
mals. Examples include: the reuse of animals in different exper-
iments versus naïve animals for each experiment; taking more 
blood from fewer animals versus a smaller amount from a great-
er number; or, in toxicology, testing using a higher dose (which 
produces a greater effect and thus requires fewer animals but 
can cause more serious harm to each animal used) versus using 
lower doses on more animals. 
the goal of Reduction follows from the “badness of kill-
ing” argument (i.e., one should, as far as possible, avoid taking 
the lives of animals (Hansen et al., 1999)). However, for other 
uses of animals, including the use of animals in food produc-
tion farming, this argument seems to garner little public sup-
port. Instead, the prevailing ethic is something like, “it is OK 
to kill animals as long as they have a good life while they are 
alive.” By extending this line of thinking, one could argue that 
killing more animals is acceptable if it allows each animal used 
to live a better life, and perhaps especially if this would avoid 
that animals live in conditions where the animal was considered 
unfortunate to be alive (FAWC, 2009). Weighing animal num-
bers versus the burden placed on the individual animals this way 
could be supported by a moral view that considers “fairness to 
the individual animal” (Tannenbaum, 1999), i.e., by spreading 
the load of distress.
the way individuals trade-off the harm of killing versus the 
harm of suffering will vary with how much value they place on 
each element. When participants in laboratory animal science 
training courses were presented with a hypothetical choice be-
tween submitting the same mouse to 20 procedures or submit-
ting 20 mice to one procedure each, 40% considered the greater 
harm to fewer animals to be the ethically preferable alternative, 
while 60% found it preferable to use more animals but to reduce 
the harm done to each individual (Franco et al., 2010). 
4  Are Replacement and Reduction  
always relevant?
In 2006, science communicators and animal welfare research-
ers initiated the Rodentia project in three Portuguese primary 
schools. The aim was that through the study of and interaction 
with laboratory rats 4th-grade children would learn about sci-
entific methodology and animal behavior (see Fonseca et al., 
2011). The project involved housing laboratory rats in tailor-
made habitats in the classrooms, where the children cared for 
the animals and studied their behavior, both in the home cage 
and in simple behavioral tests that were planned by the young 
pupils as they gradually learned about basic aspects of the scien-
tific method. This project was perceived as stimulating, engag-
ing, and educational by the humans involved. The rats remained 
calm and friendly, and regular veterinary monitoring revealed 
that they were in good health until advanced age, when they 
were euthanized. Despite this success, the project has given rise 
to some intense debate about this form of animal use. 
Why was the Rodentia project controversial? Probably be-
cause it conflicted with the ideals of Reduction and Replacement 
that aim to avoid animal use when possible, perhaps especially 
in the case of teaching, where it is typically assumed that the 
educational objectives could have been met in other ways. But 
should these ideals really apply in cases like this when animals 
are not subjected to any suffering? Indeed, one might argue that 
the high quality of care provided to these rats met or exceeded 
the level of care typically provided to companion animals. We 
suggest that applying the goals of Reduction and Replacement 
is nonsensical in cases in which animals are provided a good 
quality of life. Most people would not consider it appropriate to 
apply these goals to the keeping of companion animals, or even 
farm animals, as long as their quality of life is good.
5  How realistic is Replacement?
Replacement enjoys a particular standing among the 3Rs. It was 
the first of the Rs to be introduced by Russell and Burch (1959), 
reflecting the intended order in which the Rs were to be con-
sidered. Questions about Reduction and Refinement are only 
relevant if Replacement has first been considered and excluded. 
the goal of Replacement also has received widespread support, 
in part because it is the only goal that is fully compatible with 
the animal rights perspective that animal use solely for human 
benefit should not be permitted. In this sense, Replacement is 
probably the easiest of the 3Rs to communicate; “not tested on 
animals” is a more powerful message than, “tested on fewer 
1  NC3Rs. What are the 3Rs? http://www.nc3rs.org.uk/page.asp?id=7 (accessed 26.09.2011).
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animals” or, “tested on animals that experienced less distress.” 
Replacement models also often illustrate technical and scientific 
innovations, typically the result of years of development, which 
probably adds to their allure. Recently, however, scientists have 
started to become aware of the potential risk of overselling Re-
placement.
Policy and planning for biomedical research will vary de-
pending on how realistic one perceives the option of full Re-
placement. The anti-vivisection movement often argues that 
full Replacement is imminent. For example, BUAV argues that, 
“it’s time to move on. In the 21st century we have technologi-
cal options not available before – computer modelling, human 
cell and tissue cultures, microdosing, sophisticated imaging 
and analysis” (http://www.buav.org/humane-science/key-criti-
cisms/). If Replacement is within reach, and especially if it will 
happen soon, the goals of Reduction and Refinement become of 
little relevance and there is no need for long-term investment to 
develop approaches that use fewer animals and cause them less 
harm. The pre-eminence of Replacement is clear, even in the 
policies of research funding agencies. For example, the Europe-
an Commission Framework Programs (the joint instrument for 
funding collaborative research in the European Union) directs 
applicants to take the 3Rs into account, but Replacement is the 
only R given specific funding. 
In contrast, laboratory animal scientists often contend that 
animals are still being used in large numbers and that this use is 
likely to continue. A leading 3Rs expert recently declared that 
“entire animals are indispensable as we chart unknown and new 
scientific waters ... there is no replacement for these animals – 
we do not yet know what can be replaced” (Fosse, 2010). For 
those who take this view, continued work on Reduction and Re-
finement remain as important today as they were for Russell and 
Burch in 1959.
these differences in outlook probably stem from the diver-
gent interests of the activists versus the scientists using animals. 
Routine activities such as testing have captured the interests of 
activists, perhaps because this use is seen as being more trivi-
al, and it is for these routine tests that we have seen rapid and 
promising developments in replacement (Baker, 2011). In con-
trast, many scientists are most interested in discovery research 
addressing new ideas, often using newly developed methodolo-
gies. It is for this type of research that Fosse (2010) and others 
find it unlikely that non-animal alternatives will soon be avail-
able. But there is also a moral disagreement underlying the two 
points of view: the focus on Replacement stems from a no use 
view, whereas a focus on Reduction and Refinement is more in 
line with the view that it is OK to use animals, as long as we do 
it for a good reason and look after the animals’ welfare as far as 
possible.
6  Is relative Replacement reasonable?
the idea that there is an ethical gain in moving from “higher” 
to “lower” organisms was originally referred to as “compara-
tive replacement” (Russell and Burch, 1959). It is made explic-
it in legislation such as the european Directive, which requires 
scientists, when selecting between procedures, to choose those 
that “involve animals with the lowest capacity to experience 
pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm” (article 13.2) (Euro-
pean Union, 2010). This seems intuitively correct: a procedure 
carried out on an animal with less capacity to experience pain 
would result in less harm than the same procedure carried out 
on an animal with more capacity to suffer. The problem is that 
that there is no clear-cut way of defining capacity to experi-
ence pain, suffering, or distress. To implement this approach in 
practice would require some type of sentience scale; a hierar-
chy of species based on their capacity to suffer. Attempts have 
been made to define criteria and to distinguish larger groups 
of species (Smith and Boyd, 1991), but even this is debatable 
(Hubrecht, 2011). More cognitively complex animals may 
have a greater ability to anticipate, remember or otherwise re-
live unpleasant experiences, and hence have greater potential 
for suffering. However, these abilities may also allow for a 
greater use of gating mechanisms that distract animals from 
pain, or the ability to put periods of suffering into balance with 
positive life experiences. 
Rather than reflecting the ability to suffer, existing rankings 
seem instead to relate to the socio-zoological scale (Arluke and 
Sanders, 1996). This ordering of animals is based on how they 
are perceived by humans, with those highly valued at the top 
of the scale and those considered harmful or repulsive at the 
bottom. Among the vertebrate species used for research, the hi-
erarchy starts with the great apes (at the top), followed by other 
non-human primates, dogs and cats, pigs, etc., with rodents and 
fish near the bottom. This is not to say that the socio-zoological 
scale lacks moral relevance; for those taking a contractarian or 
a relational outlook on ethics, this scale will be central (see Ols-
son et al., 2010), but for those who are more focused on animal 
welfare or respect for animals, this is not a relevant considera-
tion. So again, moral principles are at stake when deciding how 
to interpret and apply the 3Rs principle.
7  Concluding remarks
the wide acceptance of the 3Rs has provided a roadmap for 
addressing issues in laboratory animal welfare, but important 
disagreements about the values that underline the Rs must be 
better understood and addressed. Some of these disagreements 
cannot be easily settled, as they result from differences in under-
lying views on the human-animal relationship. These disagree-
ments do not undermine the value of the 3Rs but rather reinforce 
the need for deliberation involving researchers and the public 
in developing sensible policies that address these issues. Since 
closing it is bound to be an impossible task, minding the ethical 
gap may be the best we can do to avoid falling into it. 
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